A conjecture that we examine openly here, without endorsing it: crises and sanctions have steered money away from small business owners, GDP grows mainly through richer corporations and debt-financed public spending, and therefore misrepresents the situation. We split the conjecture into six parts and set each against the data.
The conjecture in six parts
First: money is moving away from small business owners. Second: GDP grows mainly because the big get richer. Third: it grows through debt-financed public spending. Fourth: large firms cut jobs while the state adds them. Fifth: GDP therefore does not reflect the situation correctly. Sixth: it is “produced on credit”. Each part may hold or not on its own.
1 Money moving away from small owners? Partly
The share of small and medium-sized firms in value added was 47.7% in 2021 and 46.2% in 2024. Older values around 54 percent are not comparable because the counting method changed: since 2018, formally separate small units of a group count as part of a large enterprise. In turnover, the share fell from 34.4% (2013) to 28.0% (2023) according to the Institute for SME Research (IfM Bonn), again with breaks. At the same time, the Mittelstand is not bleeding on average: KfW reports a return on sales of 7.5 percent and an equity ratio of 30.7 percent for 2025, though real turnover was 1.5 percent lower. Credit became harder in 2026: 40.5 percent of SMEs seeking loans found their bank restrictive in the second quarter.
Business economy, firms with fewer than 250 employees, percent. Only years with the same method (from 2021).
| Year | Share |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 47.7% |
| 2022 | 47.6% |
| 2023 | 46.0% |
| 2024 | 46.2% |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat sbs_sc_ovw, 30.9.2026.
2 Are the big getting richer? Rather not
The corporate profit share fell to 35.6% in 2025, the lowest since 2014. DAX companies earned 4 percent less in 2025, carmakers 42 percent less; only finance and defence firms reported records. The 100 largest companies generated 13.9 percent of value added in 2024, compared with about 19 percent around 1980 (Monopolies Commission). Profits by firm size are not publicly available; a gap remains here.
Gross operating surplus of non-financial corporations as percent of their value added.
| Year | Germany | EU |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 40.0 | 39.7 |
| 2015 | 39.7 | 40.7 |
| 2016 | 39.8 | 40.6 |
| 2017 | 39.6 | 40.9 |
| 2018 | 38.3 | 40.2 |
| 2019 | 36.9 | 39.8 |
| 2020 | 37.2 | 40.2 |
| 2021 | 39.9 | 42.0 |
| 2022 | 38.7 | 41.7 |
| 2023 | 39.2 | 41.5 |
| 2024 | 36.6 | 40.0 |
| 2025 | 35.6 | 39.8 |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat nasa_10_ki, 28.10.2026.
3 Does the state carry GDP? Yes, largely
From 2019 to 2025 real GDP grew by 30.3 billion euros. Government consumption alone rose by 98.6 billion, private consumption by 81.4 billion; investment fell by 48.5 billion, and higher imports subtracted 128.1 billion. Excluding government consumption, output would be roughly 2.4% below 2019. This is not an accounting error: teaching, care and health are real services. But growth came almost only from there.
Index 2019 = 100, real. “Excluding government consumption” is an approximation.
| Year | GDP excl. government consumption | GDP | Government consumption |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 91.9 | 91.2 | 88.5 |
| 2015 | 93.3 | 92.8 | 91.0 |
| 2016 | 95.0 | 95.0 | 94.7 |
| 2017 | 98.1 | 97.7 | 96.2 |
| 2018 | 99.4 | 98.9 | 97.2 |
| 2019 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2020 | 93.7 | 96.0 | 104.9 |
| 2021 | 97.6 | 99.8 | 108.2 |
| 2022 | 99.9 | 101.6 | 108.6 |
| 2023 | 98.9 | 100.6 | 107.3 |
| 2024 | 97.8 | 100.6 | 111.5 |
| 2025 | 97.6 | 100.8 | 113.5 |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat nama_10_gdp, 22.10.2026.
Change 2019 to 2025, billion euros, real. Higher imports count negatively. Approximate, because chain-linked values do not add up exactly.
| Component | bn euros |
|---|---|
| Government consumption | +98.6 |
| Private consumption | +81.4 |
| Exports | +0.9 |
| Investment | −48.5 |
| Higher imports | −128.1 |
| GDP total | +30.3 |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat nama_10_gdp, 22.10.2026.
4 Do the big cut jobs and the state add them? For industry, yes
In 2025 manufacturing employed 511,000 fewer people than in 2019, public services, education and health 1,084,000 more. The public service in the narrow sense grew to about 5.5 million employees by mid-2025, mainly in schools, childcare and universities. For large firms overall the picture does not hold until 2024: firms with 250 or more employees had about 776,000 more employees in 2024 than in 2021, small and medium ones about 172,000 more. Cuts at large industrial firms show mainly from 2025.
Persons employed, index 2019 = 100. Public services, education and health includes private hospitals and care.
| Year | Manufacturing | Public services, education, health |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 96.2 | 91.2 |
| 2015 | 96.6 | 93.0 |
| 2016 | 96.9 | 95.0 |
| 2017 | 97.8 | 96.8 |
| 2018 | 99.5 | 98.4 |
| 2019 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2020 | 97.6 | 101.6 |
| 2021 | 96.1 | 103.9 |
| 2022 | 96.3 | 105.5 |
| 2023 | 96.4 | 106.5 |
| 2024 | 95.4 | 107.9 |
| 2025 | 93.4 | 109.6 |
Analysis: Helfen statt Blockieren. Data: Eurostat nama_10_a10_e, 21.10.2026.
5 Does GDP misrepresent the situation? It does not show everything, but it does not gloss over it
GDP measures production, not distribution, wealth or the quality of public services; experts largely agree on that. But it does not hide the weakness: per head it is 0.7% below 2019. Households’ real disposable income per head, including public services in kind, rose by +6.2%. Income inequality has hovered around a Gini value of 30 for years (2025: 30.1). Wealth inequality is high, but unchanged between 2021 and 2023 according to the Bundesbank (Gini 72.4 after 72.8).
6 “Produced on credit”? Understandable as an image, not as a measurement error
The deficit was 2.9% of GDP in 2025 and 3.1 percent in the first half of 2026. Debt rose from 2,076 billion euros (2019) to 2,846 billion (2025), the ratio from 58.3% to 62.8%; in 2014 it was still 74.4%. The special fund of up to 500 billion euros for infrastructure and climate neutrality comes on top; according to the German Council of Economic Experts, less than half of it is additional. GDP correctly measures what is produced. Whether the borrowing pays off depends on whether it finances investment or current consumption.
As of 3 November 2026. The share due to sanctions cannot be cleanly measured in any part.
| Part of the conjecture | What the data support | What they refute | What is open |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 Money moves away from small owners | SME share of turnover and value added down slightly; credit hurdle at a record in 2026 | Mid-sized firms’ return of 7.5 percent and equity ratio of 30.7 percent are solid | Situation of micro firms; role of sanctions |
| 2 The big get richer | Records in finance and defence | Profit share, DAX profits and concentration down | Profits by firm size |
| 3 The state carries GDP | Government consumption up 13.5 percent, GDP up 0.8 percent | Government consumption is mostly tax-financed | Whether the special fund adds investment |
| 4 The big cut jobs, the state adds them | Manufacturing down 511,000; public services and health up 1,084,000 | Large firms overall added jobs until 2024 | Size classes for 2025 and 2026 |
| 5 GDP misrepresents the situation | GDP does not show distribution or debt | Per head it openly shows stagnation; income inequality stable | Wealth after 2023 |
| 6 Produced on credit | Deficit and rising debt since 2019 | Measurement is correct; debt ratio below 2014 and the EU | Whether debt goes into investment |
Helfen statt Blockieren, report on economic effects, 3 Nov 2026.
And sanctions?
The strongest link runs through expensive energy to industry and job losses there; those prices result from war, Russia’s supply cut and EU embargoes together. For small firms’ credit, a channel via bank caution is plausible but not measured. For the other parts, the data show no robust link to sanctions.
The comparison with the EU and the world is in “The case of Germany”.
Check the numbers
The time series are available as CSV files and the calculation as a Python script without extra libraries: daten/abruf.py downloads the data from Eurostat and the IMF, daten/auswertung.py computes the results (ergebnis_*.csv). Chain-linked volumes do not add up exactly; differences in the last digit are rounding.
This piece is information, not legal or investment advice. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan.
Sources
- Eurostat, nama_10_gdp, nama_10_pc, nama_10_a10_e, nasa_10_ki, sbs_sc_ovw, ilc_di12, gov_10dd_edpt1, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/
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All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026.