In 1950, 18 sanctions cases were in force worldwide; in 2023 there were 615. Most are imposed by the United States, but the EU, the United Kingdom, Russia and China also sanction more than they used to. This lead article puts the time series in context: who sanctions, with what, for what, whether it works and what the count does not tell us.
Knowledge in seven steps: step 1
What is being counted
Sanction, embargo, blockade: the words overlap. A sanction is a measure taken by a state or an organisation against a country, a company or a person, such as an export ban, an asset freeze or a travel ban. An embargo stops trade with a country entirely or in large part. Secondary sanctions also threaten firms in third countries. This website uses “blockade” as an umbrella term for anything that blocks trade, payments or travel between people who decided nothing themselves. The Cuban government speaks of the “bloqueo”, the United Nations of the embargo; we write “US embargo”. A short introduction is available under the topic of the week.
A time series in three phases
The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) counts 18 cases in force in 1950, 136 in 1990, 181 in 2010 and 615 in 2023. Until 1989 the stock grew steadily by about 2.6 cases a year. From 1990 to 2009 it stayed almost flat: many Cold War cases ended while the United Nations and the EU in particular imposed new ones. The best-fitting line bends in 2018 (or 2019 if only three instead of five years are required after the bend); from 2019 to 2023 the trend added about 88 cases a year. The database authors explain this by the fact that hardly any sanctions were lifted while many new ones were imposed, from 2022 mainly against Russia and Belarus.
Number of cases in force in a given year. The EU appears as a joint sender from 1978. “Others” covers all remaining states, including the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Canada and Japan.
| Year | USA | EU | UN | Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 1951 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 14 |
| 1952 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| 1953 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| 1954 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 23 |
| 1955 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| 1956 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 18 |
| 1957 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| 1958 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 21 |
| 1959 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| 1960 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 21 |
| 1961 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 22 |
| 1962 | 21 | 0 | 1 | 24 |
| 1963 | 25 | 0 | 2 | 32 |
| 1964 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 31 |
| 1965 | 22 | 0 | 3 | 37 |
| 1966 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 39 |
| 1967 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 40 |
| 1968 | 24 | 0 | 6 | 42 |
| 1969 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 43 |
| 1970 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 41 |
| 1971 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 38 |
| 1972 | 20 | 0 | 6 | 35 |
| 1973 | 18 | 0 | 6 | 54 |
| 1974 | 19 | 0 | 6 | 59 |
| 1975 | 23 | 0 | 5 | 48 |
| 1976 | 26 | 0 | 4 | 46 |
| 1977 | 36 | 0 | 5 | 49 |
| 1978 | 38 | 1 | 4 | 55 |
| 1979 | 41 | 2 | 4 | 59 |
| 1980 | 39 | 0 | 2 | 49 |
| 1981 | 43 | 2 | 2 | 50 |
| 1982 | 43 | 4 | 2 | 66 |
| 1983 | 40 | 3 | 2 | 62 |
| 1984 | 38 | 2 | 3 | 60 |
| 1985 | 39 | 2 | 3 | 49 |
| 1986 | 41 | 5 | 4 | 52 |
| 1987 | 47 | 4 | 4 | 58 |
| 1988 | 46 | 4 | 4 | 60 |
| 1989 | 51 | 5 | 4 | 64 |
| 1990 | 56 | 8 | 6 | 66 |
| 1991 | 52 | 10 | 8 | 66 |
| 1992 | 55 | 17 | 12 | 77 |
| 1993 | 58 | 17 | 14 | 78 |
| 1994 | 59 | 18 | 16 | 65 |
| 1995 | 60 | 16 | 11 | 56 |
| 1996 | 61 | 20 | 14 | 54 |
| 1997 | 63 | 22 | 15 | 52 |
| 1998 | 64 | 24 | 17 | 50 |
| 1999 | 59 | 27 | 16 | 47 |
| 2000 | 57 | 26 | 20 | 46 |
| 2001 | 59 | 25 | 21 | 43 |
| 2002 | 57 | 26 | 18 | 34 |
| 2003 | 69 | 29 | 17 | 40 |
| 2004 | 64 | 26 | 15 | 36 |
| 2005 | 56 | 27 | 19 | 44 |
| 2006 | 60 | 26 | 22 | 51 |
| 2007 | 60 | 25 | 22 | 50 |
| 2008 | 62 | 25 | 21 | 49 |
| 2009 | 62 | 31 | 21 | 59 |
| 2010 | 61 | 29 | 25 | 66 |
| 2011 | 72 | 38 | 27 | 80 |
| 2012 | 81 | 42 | 30 | 86 |
| 2013 | 87 | 45 | 32 | 83 |
| 2014 | 89 | 52 | 35 | 100 |
| 2015 | 83 | 48 | 37 | 89 |
| 2016 | 85 | 46 | 36 | 94 |
| 2017 | 91 | 38 | 31 | 82 |
| 2018 | 101 | 36 | 31 | 84 |
| 2019 | 124 | 35 | 29 | 83 |
| 2020 | 146 | 41 | 29 | 89 |
| 2021 | 180 | 47 | 29 | 144 |
| 2022 | 225 | 55 | 30 | 190 |
| 2023 | 286 | 67 | 29 | 233 |
Source: GSDB Release 4, figures 1 and 5b, digitised by Helfen statt Blockieren; annual values in wirtschaftsblockaden/daten/gsdb_r4_jahr.csv. Values per actor rounded.
Who sanctions
The United States has been the largest single sender throughout. Its share of all active cases was 32.1 percent in 2014, 47.7 percent in 2020 and 46.5 percent in 2023; since 2018 the trend has added about 37 cases a year. Many of them target individuals and firms, not entire economies. The EU appears as a joint sender from 1978 and had 67 active cases in 2023. The United Nations rarely sanctioned before 1990; its stock rose to 37 by 2015 and has fallen since, because vetoes in the Security Council block new decisions, for instance after the coup in Niger in 2023. All other states have grown as steeply as the US since 2018; the database points to Russian counter-sanctions after the attack on Ukraine and to the United Kingdom’s own sanctions after Brexit.
“Who blocks whom” is therefore not a one-way street. Since 2014 Russia has banned food imports from all EU states and has extended the ban to the end of 2028; China lists entities from the EU on its countermeasure and export-control lists, for example 14 on 24 July 2026. The globe “who sanctions whom” shows both, with a source for each entry: as of 3 November 2026 it covers 19 actors and 347 entries for 85 countries and territories. Much is missing for China in older collections: a dedicated dataset counts 135 episodes with China as sender from 1949 to 2020, more than 70 percent of which appeared in no earlier dataset.
What sanctions consist of
In 1950, 61.9 percent of all measures were trade sanctions; in 2023 only 21.2 percent, although their number rose. Financial sanctions, meaning frozen assets and bans on dealings with banks, grew to 36.4 percent, and travel restrictions on individuals from 4.4 percent in 1990 to 22.1 percent. Researchers see this as the shift from comprehensive to targeted measures. For bystanders it means that the block now sits less often at customs and more often in payments. Why this hits permitted business is explained in the lead article “Permitted and still blocked”.
Percent of all active measures in the year. One case can involve several types.
| Type | 1950 | 1990 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trade | 61.9% | 24.3% | 21.2% |
| Arms | 4.8% | 14.1% | 7.7% |
| Military aid | 0.0% | 12.6% | 6.4% |
| Finance | 9.6% | 33.0% | 36.4% |
| Travel | 9.5% | 4.4% | 22.1% |
| other | 14.3% | 11.7% | 6.2% |
Source: GSDB Release 4, figure 2, digitised by Helfen statt Blockieren (accurate to about two cases).
What sanctions are for
Article 41 of the UN Charter provides for measures not involving armed force, including the interruption of economic relations; only if they prove inadequate does Article 42 follow. Sanctions are thus meant as a step before war, which is why the Knowledge section also includes Wars and conflicts since 1926. The reasons have shifted: human rights became a major theme in the 1970s, and since the early 1990s sanctions against war and terrorism have grown. In Hufbauer and co-authors, 13 of 53 new cases from 1990 to 2000 name democracy as the goal, compared with 2 of 121 before 1990. The sanctioning states justify their measures with the conduct of the other side: nuclear and missile programmes, wars of aggression, repression. The targeted governments speak of coercion and interference. Both views appear side by side on the Voices page. Take Cuba: Executive Order 14380 of January 2026 cites the Cuban government’s closeness to Russia, China and Iran as well as human rights violations and political repression; on 28 October 2026 Cuba’s foreign minister told the General Assembly that what Cuba demands is to be left in peace. Both are documented: the US embargo with its consequences and the failure of the Cuban leadership, under which Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners.
Do they work?
That depends on what counts as success. Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg rate about one third of cases up to 2000 as at least partly successful; Pape, re-examining them, accepted only 5 of 115; in the TIES dataset the figures range from 27 to 56 percent depending on the definition. Economic pressure is limited too: after 2022 Russia’s trade with the sanctioning states fell on average by about 24 percent relative to its trade with other states, because China, India and Turkey stepped in. For the world economy, the International Monetary Fund estimated in 2023 that fragmentation into blocs could cost 0.2 to 7 percent of output in the long run.
What the count does not tell us
- A case says nothing about severity: a comprehensive embargo counts the same as a travel ban on one person.
- Release 5 of the Global Sanctions Data Base counts 1,794 cases from 1950 to the end of 2025; its data are available only on request. Annual figures for active cases (such as 615 in 2023) come from the published charts of Release 4 and run to 2023. Redistribution of the data is prohibited.
- The globe counts differently from the GSDB, namely programmes per actor and country as of today. The two figures complement each other; they cannot be compared.
All values, trends and the calculation are in the time series “Who has been sanctioning more, and since when?”. How blockades run between economic areas is shown in “Economic area against economic area”.
This lead article is information, not legal advice. It reflects the view of the editorial team and relies on the sources listed and the linked building blocks. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan.
Sources
- Yalcin, Felbermayr, Kariem, Kirilakha, Kwon, Syropoulos, Yotov: The Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 4, CGPA Working Paper 2025-02, Drexel University, 22 Jan 2025 (not peer-reviewed), https://www.lebow.drexel.edu/sites/default/files/2025-01/wp2025002-global-sanctions-db-v2.pdf
- Syropoulos, Felbermayr, Kirilakha, Yalcin, Yotov: The Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 3, WIFO Working Paper 651, 2022; Review of International Economics 32(1), 2024, https://www.wifo.ac.at/wp-content/uploads/upload-3619/wp_2022_651_.pdf
- Helfen statt Blockieren, analysis of the GSDB charts: wirtschaftsblockaden/daten/gsdb_r4_jahr.csv and ergebnis_kernzahlen.json, 3 Nov 2026
- Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, Oegg: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Peterson Institute 2007, chapter 1 (publisher preview), https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4075/01iie4075.pdf
- Morgan, Bapat, Kobayashi: Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945 to 2005, Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5), 2014; Pape: Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, International Security 22(2), 1997; figures as summarised by Leng, Economic Statecraft, chapter 3, https://bookdown.org/zengyuleng/economicstatecraft/sanctions-effectiveness.html
- Zhang, Shanks: Measuring Chinese Economic Sanctions 1949 to 2020, Introducing the China TIES Dataset, Conflict Management and Peace Science 42(3), 2025, https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v42y2025i3p328-352.html
- Global Trade Alert, threads “Harmful trade interventions”, 2 Nov 2026, CC BY-NC 4.0, https://globaltradealert.org/threads/harmful-trade-interventions
- Executive Order 14380, Federal Register 91 FR 5085, 3.2.2026, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-03/html/2026-02250.htm
- Prisoners Defenders, Presos políticos en Cuba, septiembre 2026, 15.10.2026, https://www.prisonersdefenders.org/2026/10/15/presos-politicos-cuba-septiembre-2026/
- Helfen statt Blockieren, Voices: Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla at the UN General Assembly, 28 Oct 2026, source given there
- Aiyar et al.: Geoeconomic Fragmentation and the Future of Multilateralism, IMF Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001, 15.1.2023; figures via Reuters/Malay Mail, 16.1.2023, https://www.malaymail.com/news/money/2023/01/16/imf-says-fragmentation-could-cost-global-economy-up-to-7pc-of-gdp/50425
- Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-7
- Helfen statt Blockieren, globe “who sanctions whom”, entries for Russia (Decree No. 560 of 2014, extended to 31 Dec 2028) and China (countermeasures list), sources per entry, as of 3 Nov 2026
All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026.