A blockade begins with a text: a law, a list, an order. Before it reaches a family, it passes through banks, insurers, shipping lines and suppliers. This lead article follows that path station by station, says whom it hits and what it costs, and separates what comes from outside from what is added inside the country.
Knowledge in seven steps: steps 2 and 3
“What actually happens when something is blocked? Then it is a whole ecosystem that goes down.” This is how Aciel Martinez Poll describes the idea behind the Knowledge section. The sentence describes a chain. No station in it decided the blockade, and yet each one carries it further.
Six stations
- The rule. A law, a list or an order. Some address only the country’s own citizens, others also threaten firms in third countries. Executive Order 14380 of 29 January 2026 allows the US to impose additional tariffs on countries that supply oil to Cuba.
- The bank. Banks screen every payment against lists. Because violations are expensive, they often refuse more than they must: in 2014 BNP Paribas paid about 8.9 billion US dollars over business with Sudan, Iran and Cuba. According to information submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur, about 200 foreign banks have ended their relations with Cuba since 2021.
- Insurers and shipping lines. A ship that calls at a Cuban port to trade may not load or unload in a US port for 180 days. For lines that also serve the US, Cuba becomes an expensive detour.
- The suppliers. A manufacturer in Europe needs a US licence for Cuba as soon as more than 10 percent of the value of the goods comes from the US. In Iran a European manufacturer stopped selling special dressings for children with epidermolysis bullosa, even though they were permitted.
- Hospital, power, water. What is not paid for, insured or delivered is missing on the ground. According to information submitted to the Special Rapporteur, 69 percent of medicines are unavailable in Cuba, power cuts last up to 18 hours and some regions receive water only every 30 days. By August 2026 the power grid had collapsed nationwide six times.
- The family. In November 2020 Western Union closed its 407 outlets in Cuba after the US government banned dealings with Fincimex, a partner belonging to the military-run conglomerate GAESA; the Cuban government refused to switch to a provider without military ties. After a pause of about two years it resumed transfers; in February 2025 it stopped them once again. According to the statistics office the population fell to 9.4 million at the end of 2025, by about 245,000 in one year through emigration alone.
The sketch with all stations and sources is in the explainer “The ecosystem of a blockade”. How this shows up in individual areas of life, from medicine to water to migration, is set out in the twelve topic sheets.
Whom it hits
It hits hardest the people in the target country who decided nothing. In 2019 Human Rights Watch documented for Iran that banks and firms avoided even permitted deliveries. On average across many countries, UN sanctions reduce life expectancy considerably more than US sanctions, and women are affected more.
Firms in third countries and in the sanctioning country are hit as well. In the DIHK survey “Going International 2026”, 69 percent of 2,400 internationally active firms reported more trade barriers; among those facing non-tariff barriers, 30 percent named sanctions. After 2014 Russia lost about 53 billion US dollars of expected exports by the end of 2015, the sanctioning countries about 42 billion, most of it in goods that were not banned at all. The authors call this “friendly fire”: firms and banks avoid a country altogether once the risk rises. What this means for households and for small and large firms in Germany is set out in the chapter “What a blockade means for households, small firms and large companies”.
What it costs
Researchers agree on the direction, not on every figure. For 160 countries from 1976 to 2012, Neuenkirch and Neumeier find that UN sanctions reduce annual growth of income per head by more than 2 percentage points for about ten years, by 25.5 percent in total; US sanctions by 0.75 to 1 percentage points a year, over seven years 13.4 percent in total. A review of 31 quantitative studies finds negative effects in 30. Single figures call for caution: a survey on child mortality in Iraq under UN sanctions, published in 1999, is now considered manipulated.
For Cuba, the government puts the damage caused by the embargo at 147 to 164 billion US dollars before the United Nations. The working paper “The costs of the embargo and the discipline of the number” considers this sum methodologically too high and asks instead about the difference: what would disappear without the embargo, and what would remain? For Germany, direct trade with sanctioned countries is measurable and small for the economy as a whole; energy prices matter a great deal but result from war, the Russian supply stop and EU embargoes at once; and nobody measures the caution of banks. Anyone citing a single percentage should state their assumptions. The detailed calculation is in “The case of Germany”; “Economic area against economic area” opens the view to the world.
What is added inside the country
Not every shortage comes from outside. In Cuba the 2021 currency reform “Tarea Ordenamiento” sharply devalued the peso and set off severe inflation; critics point to decades of underinvestment in the energy sector; Freedom House gives Cuba’s internet 19 out of 100 points and describes state censorship. Amnesty International called the releases of 2025 selective, and Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners in September 2026. Even the UN Special Rapporteur, who calls for an end to US sanctions, notes that the primary responsibility for human rights lies with Cuba. The US embargo and the failure of the Cuban leadership are two causes of different origin. Naming only one explains half the situation. For Venezuela it is similarly disputed whether the US sanctions from 2017 or the oil industry that had collapsed before explain the larger part of the hardship.
What the figures do not tell us
- Many figures on Cuba come from information submitted to the Special Rapporteur, not from her own measurement.
- No authority counts refused or delayed permitted payments.
- Studies show averages across many countries; a single country can fare better or worse.
This lead article is information, not legal advice. It reflects the view of the editorial team and relies on the sources listed and the linked building blocks. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan.
Sources
- OHCHR, Alena Douhan, Special Rapporteur, preliminary findings of the visit to Cuba, 11 to 21 Nov 2025, end-of-mission statement, 21.11.2025, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2133521/20251121-eom-stm-cuba-sr-negative-impact-unilateral-en.pdf
- Executive Order 14380, Federal Register 91 FR 5085, 3.2.2026, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-02-03/html/2026-02250.htm
- Banque de France, ACPR, Following the agreement signed between the US authorities and BNP Paribas, 30.6.2014, https://acpr.banque-france.fr/en/press-release/following-agreement-signed-between-us-authorities-and-bnp-paribas
- 31 CFR § 515.207, Entry of vessels engaged in trade with Cuba (Cornell LII), https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/31/515.207
- Kelley Drye, BIS tightens Cuba restrictions, lowers de minimis threshold to 10 percent, 21.10.2019, https://www.kelleydrye.com/viewpoints/blogs/trade-and-manufacturing-monitor/bis-tightens-cuba-restrictions-lowers-de-minimis-threshold-to-10-percent
- Human Rights Watch, Maximum Pressure, 29.10.2019, https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/10/29/maximum-pressure/us-economic-sanctions-harm-iranians-right-health
- Al Jazeera, Grid failure plunges Cuba into nationwide blackout, 3.8.2026, https://aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/3/grid-failure-plunges-cuba-into-nationwide-blackout
- NBC News, Western Union remittances to Cuba come to an end, November 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/because-trump-sanctions-western-union-remittances-come-end-cuba-n1248790
- Havana Times (14ymedio), Western Union Suspends Money Transfers to Cuba, 8.2.2025, https://havanatimes.org/news/western-union-suspends-money-transfers-to-cuba
- ONEI, Indicadores demográficos 2025, via Diario de Cuba, October 2026, https://diariodecuba.com/cuba/1792841171_69524.html
- Gutmann, Neuenkirch, Neumeier, Journal of Development Studies 57(1), 2021, https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:57:y:2021:i:1:p:139-162
- DIHK, Going International 2026, 24.3.2026, https://www.dihk.de/de/newsroom/going-international-2026-handelshemmnisse-auf-rekordniveau-175218
- Crozet, Hinz, Friendly fire, Economic Policy 35(101), 2020, https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:35:y:2020:i:101:p:97-146.
- Neuenkirch, Neumeier, The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth, European Journal of Political Economy 40, 2015 (abstract checked 3.11.2026), https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:poleco:v:40:y:2015:i:pa:p:110-125
- Rodríguez, Journal of Economic Studies 51(4), 2024, https://emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JES-06-2023-0299
- Dyson, Cetorelli, BMJ Global Health 2(2), 2017, e000311, https://gh.bmj.com/content/2/2/e000311.abstract
- Martinez Poll, „Die Kosten des Embargos und die Disziplin der Zahl“, Zenodo 2026, Arbeitsfassung, nicht begutachtet, CC BY 4.0, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.21870428
- Freedom House, Cuba: Freedom on the Net 2026, https://freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-net/2026
- Amnesty International, Cuba: a un año de excarcelaciones selectivas, 19.1.2026, https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2026/01/cuba-a-un-ano-de-excarcelaciones-selectivas-exigimos-libertad-inmediata-para-las-personas-presas-por-motivos-politicos/
- Prisoners Defenders, Presos políticos en Cuba, septiembre 2026, 15.10.2026, https://www.prisonersdefenders.org/2026/10/15/presos-politicos-cuba-septiembre-2026/
- Hausmann, Muci, Americas Quarterly, 1.5.2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/dont-blame-washington-for-venezuelas-oil-woes-a-rebuttal/
All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026.
