A third, five percent or more than half: depending on the study, sanctions succeed rarely or often. Showing only the costs and never the aims is as far from neutral as showing only the aims. This review puts the main counts side by side, explains why they differ, and adds the latest state of the largest database.
What does “work” mean?
States impose sanctions for different reasons. In her contribution for Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education, political scientist Maria J. Debre names, besides changing the target’s behaviour, the signalling effect of showing that a red line has been crossed, reassurance towards one’s own population, international ostracism, such as of Russia after the attack on Ukraine, and disarmament aims. A sanction can fail to change a country’s behaviour and still achieve its aim if the aim was a signal. Studies that ask only about behavioural change therefore measure only part.
There is also the difference between economic pressure and political outcome. Sanctions can hit a country’s economy hard without its government giving way. According to the working paper on Release 4, Russia’s trade with sanctioning states fell after 2022 on average by about 24 percent more than with other states, because China, India and Türkiye stepped in; this is in the lead article “Who blocks whom”. Whether that shortens the war is another question.
Three counts, three results
Hufbauer and co-authors. The collection by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott and Barbara Oegg at the Peterson Institute in Washington rates about one third of cases up to 2000 as at least partly successful. It counts partial successes too.
Pape. In 1997 political scientist Robert Pape re-examined the same cases by stricter standards. He accepted only 5 of 115 cases.
TIES. The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset by T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat and Yoshiharu Kobayashi also includes cases in which sanctions were only threatened. Depending on definition, success there lies between 27 and 56 percent. Because TIES also records threats, it includes cases missing from other collections because the sanction was never imposed.
Share of successful cases in percent. Dot: single value; bar: range depending on definition.
| Study | Success rate |
|---|---|
| Hufbauer et al. 2007 | about one third (cases to 2000) |
| Pape 1997 | 5 of 115, about 4 percent |
| TIES 2014 | 27 to 56 percent depending on definition |
Sources: Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, Oegg, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed. 2007; Pape 1997 and TIES via Leng, Economic Statecraft, ch. 3; accessed 3 Nov 2026.
The largest database: GSDB Release 5
The Global Sanctions Data Base is run by Drexel University in Philadelphia, Konstanz University of Applied Sciences and the Austrian Institute of Economic Research. Release 5 extends it to the end of 2025 with 1,794 cases; compared with Release 4, with 1,547 cases to 2023, 283 were added and 36 removed after review. For each political objective of a case the database assigns one of five ratings: total success, partial success, negotiated settlement, failure or ongoing.
The authors of the first edition, Gabriel Felbermayr and co-authors, wrote in 2020 that the success rate rose until 1995 and has fallen since. In the 2025 working paper on Release 4 they call the question of success an open research field and note that the share of ongoing sanctions has been higher in recent years than ever. In other words: many sanctions are imposed and hardly lifted, whether they succeed or not.
The GSDB releases its data only on request and prohibits redistribution. This website therefore shows no analysis of its own of Release 5. The time series “Who has been sanctioning more, and since when?” rests on the published charts of Release 4; its annual figures for active cases run to 2023.
When sanctions are more likely to succeed
Debre summarises the state of research as follows: what matters is the ability to impose high costs on the target. Prospects improve when demands are precise and aims clear; when many states take part, the target finds it harder to get partners to step in. But even costly sanctions fail when the target government controls the narrative. As cases in which sanctions missed their aims she names Cuba, Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Zimbabwe. Targeted sanctions can also reinforce repression, corruption and the shadow economy.
What supporters say
Sanctions are often the only means between words and weapons. Even without behavioural change they can withhold resources, for instance for weapons programmes, send a signal and bind allies. In many cases the threat alone works.
What critics say
Most sanctions do not achieve their stated aims, yet they last for decades and hit people who decided nothing. Targeted sanctions spare the population less than promised; the number of ongoing cases grows because hardly any end.
Cuba as a case
The US embargo on Cuba has existed in comprehensive form since the early 1960s. It has not achieved its stated aim of political change in Cuba; Debre counts Cuba among the failed cases. Supporters of the embargo point to the human rights situation: Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners in September 2026. Critics point to the consequences for supply and to the fact that on 28 October 2026 the General Assembly rejected the embargo by a majority for the 34th time. Both halves are covered in “Cuba: human rights and political prisoners”.
This article is information, not legal advice. It relies on the sources listed; where experts disagree, it names the positions and who holds them. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan.
Sources
- Global Sanctions Data Base, homepage, Release 5 (1,794 cases, coverage to end of 2025; data on request, no redistribution), https://globalsanctionsdatabase.com/
- Yalcin, Felbermayr, Kariem, Kirilakha, Kwon, Syropoulos, Yotov: The Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 4, CGPA Working Paper 2025-02, Drexel University, January 2025, https://www.lebow.drexel.edu/sites/default/files/2025-01/wp2025002-global-sanctions-db-v2.pdf
- Felbermayr, Kirilakha, Syropoulos, Yalcin, Yotov: The global sanctions data base, European Economic Review 129 (2020); abstract at IDEAS/RePEc, https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/drxlwp/2020_002.html
- Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, Oegg: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Peterson Institute 2007, chapter 1 (publisher preview), https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4075/01iie4075.pdf
- Pape: Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, International Security 22(2), 1997; Morgan, Bapat, Kobayashi: Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945 to 2005, Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5), 2014; figures as summarised by Leng, Economic Statecraft, chapter 3, https://bookdown.org/zengyuleng/economicstatecraft/sanctions-effectiveness.html
- Maria J. Debre: Alternative zum Krieg, APuZ „Sanktionen“, bpb, 14.2.2025, https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/sanktionen-2025/559418/alternative-zum-krieg/
- Helfen statt Blockieren: lead article “Who blocks whom” (Russia’s trade, sources there)
- Prisoners Defenders: Presos políticos en Cuba, septiembre 2026, 15.10.2026, https://www.prisonersdefenders.org/2026/10/15/presos-politicos-cuba-septiembre-2026/
All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026.