A situation report in eight chapters: how the world economy is doing in autumn 2026, which blockades are in effect, what they do in the Americas, Europe, Russia, China, Asia, the Gulf, Africa and Cuba, what money, law and labour need, and which paths the major institutions consider possible. With data tables, charts and all sources, without a forecast of our own.
Summary
1. The world economy in autumn 2026
In October 2026 the IMF expects the world economy to grow by 3.1 percent, after 3.5 percent in 2025, and by 3.4 percent in 2027. At market exchange rates the World Bank expects 2.5 percent (June), the OECD 2.9 percent (September). Advanced economies grow by 2.1 percent, emerging and developing economies by 3.7 percent. The Middle East suffers the sharpest slump: minus 0.3 percent for the region, minus 3.3 percent in Saudi Arabia, minus 7.6 percent in Iran. Global inflation rises to 4.7 percent because oil costs an average of 96 US dollars a barrel, 41 percent more than in 2025.
Real GDP, change on 2025 in percent, IMF projection of October 2026. World: +3.1 percent.
| Economy | Growth 2026 |
|---|---|
| India (fiscal year) | +7.0% |
| China | +4.5% |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | +4.5% |
| United States | +2.3% |
| Brazil | +2.2% |
| Germany | +1.3% |
| Euro area | +1.1% |
| Russia | +0.9% |
| Middle East and Central Asia | −0.3% |
| Saudi Arabia | −3.3% |
| Iran | −7.6% |
Source: IMF DataMapper (NGDP_RPCH, WEO October 2026), accessed 3 Nov 2026.
| Economy or region | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 | 2027 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| World | 3.5 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 3.4 |
| Advanced economies | 2.0 | 2.0 | 2.1 | 1.8 |
| Emerging and developing economies | 4.5 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 4.4 |
| United States | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Euro area | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Germany | 0.0 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 1.1 |
| China | 5.0 | 5.0 | 4.5 | 4.0 |
| India (fiscal year) | 7.2 | 7.8 | 7.0 | 7.0 |
| Russia | 4.9 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Brazil | 3.4 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| Mexico | 1.5 | 0.5 | 1.5 | 1.8 |
| Latin America and the Caribbean | n/a | 2.5 | 2.3 | 2.5 |
| Saudi Arabia | 2.6 | 4.6 | −3.3 | 7.9 |
| Iran | 3.7 | −0.9 | −7.6 | 3.6 |
| Middle East and Central Asia | 3.0 | 3.7 | −0.3 | 6.3 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.5 |
| Nigeria | 4.1 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 4.3 |
| South Africa | 0.5 | 1.1 | 1.0 | 1.3 |
Source: IMF DataMapper (NGDP_RPCH, WEO October 2026) and WEO October 2026, table 1.1 (Latin America); 2026 and 2027 projections. File daten/ergebnis_iwf_wachstum.csv.
The World Bank and OECD figures are calculated at market exchange rates and are therefore lower than those of the IMF, which weights countries by purchasing power; the direction is the same.
2. Trade: volumes, values, shifts
According to UNCTAD, trade in goods and services reached a record 35 trillion US dollars in 2025. According to the WTO, merchandise trade volume grew by 4.2 percent in 2025; it expects 3.9 percent for 2026 and 4.1 percent for 2027, and 3.7 and 4.7 percent for goods and services combined (the IMF expects 4.6 and 4.7 percent). The upswing is narrow: goods for artificial intelligence accounted for 14.8 percent of merchandise trade and about 47 percent of its growth in the first half of 2026; ten economies supply about 85 percent of them. Overall integration has stalled: world trade was equivalent to 60.3 percent of world output in 2008 and 56.7 percent in 2024 (World Bank).
| Region | Exports 2026 | Exports 2027 | Imports 2026 | Imports 2027 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North America | +5.7 | +1.5 | +1.4 | +2.7 |
| South America | +3.4 | +3.4 | +4.6 | +4.7 |
| Europe | −0.1 | +1.8 | +0.5 | +1.4 |
| CIS | −3.9 | +5.3 | +8.8 | +2.2 |
| Africa | +5.6 | −0.7 | +8.9 | +5.3 |
| Middle East | −17.2 | +23.3 | −15.4 | +17.0 |
| Asia | +9.9 | +5.2 | +9.5 | +5.6 |
| World, merchandise trade | +3.9 | +4.1 |
Source: WTO, Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, update October 2026.
Percent of the value of all world merchandise exports in US dollars. Exchange rates affect the shares.
| Year | China | United States | Germany | Japan |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 3.8 | 12.1 | 8.5 | 7.4 |
| 2001 | 4.3 | 11.7 | 9.2 | 6.5 |
| 2002 | 5.0 | 10.6 | 9.4 | 6.4 |
| 2003 | 5.7 | 9.5 | 9.9 | 6.2 |
| 2004 | 6.4 | 8.8 | 9.8 | 6.1 |
| 2005 | 7.2 | 8.5 | 9.2 | 5.6 |
| 2006 | 7.9 | 8.4 | 9.1 | 5.3 |
| 2007 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 9.4 | 5.1 |
| 2008 | 8.8 | 7.9 | 8.9 | 4.8 |
| 2009 | 9.5 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 4.6 |
| 2010 | 10.3 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 5.0 |
| 2011 | 10.3 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 4.5 |
| 2012 | 11.0 | 8.3 | 7.5 | 4.3 |
| 2013 | 11.6 | 8.3 | 7.6 | 3.8 |
| 2014 | 12.3 | 8.5 | 7.8 | 3.6 |
| 2015 | 13.7 | 9.0 | 8.0 | 3.8 |
| 2016 | 13.0 | 9.0 | 8.3 | 4.0 |
| 2017 | 12.7 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 3.9 |
| 2018 | 12.7 | 8.5 | 7.9 | 3.8 |
| 2019 | 13.1 | 8.6 | 7.8 | 3.7 |
| 2020 | 14.6 | 8.0 | 7.8 | 3.6 |
| 2021 | 14.8 | 7.8 | 7.3 | 3.4 |
| 2022 | 14.2 | 8.2 | 6.7 | 3.0 |
| 2023 | 14.1 | 8.4 | 7.1 | 3.0 |
| 2024 | 14.5 | 8.4 | 6.8 | 2.9 |
| 2025 | 14.3 | 8.3 | 6.7 | 2.8 |
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, TX.VAL.MRCH.CD.WT (WTO data), as of 8 Oct 2026; shares: Helfen statt Blockieren, daten/ergebnis_wb_anteil_warenausfuhr.csv.
The weights are shifting: China’s share of world merchandise exports rose from 3.8 percent (2000) to 14.3 percent (2025), that of the US fell from 12.1 to 8.3 percent and Germany’s from 8.5 to 6.7 percent. According to UNCTAD, direct investment rose by 6 percent to 1.6 trillion US dollars in 2025, by 11 percent into developed and by 2 percent into developing economies, while it fell by 26 percent into Africa.
3. The tools of blockade
Blockades work through five channels: sanctions against states, firms and individuals; tariffs; export controls on technology and raw materials; restrictions on payments; and closures of sea routes. The table summarises the key figures. The time series are in Sanctions since 1950 and Economic bloc against economic bloc; this report does not repeat them but puts them in context.
| Tool | Key figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Sanctions | 615 cases in force (2023), 121 new in 2023; US 46.5 percent of cases | GSDB, Release 4 |
| Trade barriers | 4,351 new harmful measures in 2025, 1,547 liberalising | Global Trade Alert, key figure |
| G20 import restrictions | cover 22.0 percent of G20 imports (mid-October 2025) | WTO, 32nd G20 report |
| US tariffs | average effective rate about 12 percent (June 2026); IMF assumption 13.5 percent (April 2026) | World Bank; IMF |
| Export controls on raw materials | roughly fivefold 2009 to 2024; 16 percent of trade affected | OECD |
| EU sanctions packages against Russia | 21 by July 2026; transaction bans on more than 100 banks; 673 vessels listed | European Commission |
| Withdrawal of correspondent banks | minus 19.4 to minus 47.1 percent by region, 2011 to 2022 | BIS, CPMI |
| Sea routes | Strait of Hormuz: about 20 million barrels a day before the war, of which 3.5 to 5.5 million diverted | WTO |
World Uncertainty Index, global average of 143 countries, annual mean; average 1990 to 2019 = 100. 2026: first three quarters.
| Year | Index |
|---|---|
| 1995 | 65 |
| 1996 | 72 |
| 1997 | 67 |
| 1998 | 86 |
| 1999 | 75 |
| 2000 | 77 |
| 2001 | 91 |
| 2002 | 89 |
| 2003 | 104 |
| 2004 | 87 |
| 2005 | 91 |
| 2006 | 89 |
| 2007 | 86 |
| 2008 | 84 |
| 2009 | 88 |
| 2010 | 96 |
| 2011 | 112 |
| 2012 | 143 |
| 2013 | 143 |
| 2014 | 126 |
| 2015 | 149 |
| 2016 | 176 |
| 2017 | 154 |
| 2018 | 126 |
| 2019 | 169 |
| 2020 | 173 |
| 2021 | 138 |
| 2022 | 150 |
| 2023 | 132 |
| 2024 | 112 |
| 2025 | 294 |
| 2026 (three quarters) | 296 |
Source: Ahir, Bloom and Furceri, World Uncertainty Index, via FRED (WUIGLOBALSMPAVG), accessed 3 Nov 2026. Annual means and rescaling: Helfen statt Blockieren, daten/ergebnis_wui_jahr.csv.
Uncertainty hangs over all the tools. The World Uncertainty Index stood at 294 in 2025 and 296 in the first three quarters of 2026 (1990 to 2019 average = 100). The Federal Reserve’s trade policy uncertainty index stood at 538 in 2025 and 253 for 2026 up to October, after mostly 24 to 30 in 2010 to 2014.
4. Regions in detail
The Americas
US 2026: +2.3% · Latin America and the Caribbean: +2.3% · effective US tariff about 12%
The United States is both the largest imposer of sanctions (46.5 percent of all cases in 2023 according to the GSDB) and the country with the sharpest tariff increases since 2025. After the Supreme Court ruling of February 2026 against tariffs under the emergency powers law, the effective tariff rate fell from about 14 to about 12 percent, according to the World Bank. On 1 July 2026 the United States declined to extend the agreement with Canada and Mexico; it remains in force until 2036 but is reviewed annually. US imports from China fell by 29 percent in 2025 (WTO).
In Latin America and the Caribbean the economy grows by 2.3 percent in 2026 according to the IMF, Brazil by 2.2 and Mexico by 1.5 percent. Since 2011 the region has lost 47.1 percent of its correspondent banking relationships, the Caribbean 52.1 percent (BIS). The agreement between the EU and Mercosur has been provisionally applied since May 2026.
Europe
Euro area 2026: +1.1% · Germany: +1.3% · European export volume 2026: −0.1%
Europe’s merchandise exports stagnate in 2026 according to the WTO. The EU sanctions more than ever (21 packages against Russia) but hardly enforces its protection against third-country sanctions and has not completed its single market: barriers equivalent to a tariff of around 45 percent on goods and 110 percent on services (IMF). Germany, particularly open with trade at 79.1 percent of GDP, exported 9.4 percent less to the US and 9.7 percent less to China in 2025 (Destatis). Details: Where the EU falls short, and where it does not, What does Germany need?.
Russia
2026: +0.9% · oil and gas revenue January to October 2025: −21% · 58% of EU exports to Russia covered
Sanctions against no other large economy are as comprehensive. According to the European External Action Service, EU restrictions cover 58 percent of former exports and 61 percent of imports. State oil and gas revenues fell by 21 percent to 7.5 trillion roubles from January to October 2025, partly because of low oil prices and a strong rouble (finance ministry via The Moscow Times). According to the IMF, the economy grows by 0.9 percent in 2026. Trade partly runs through neighbours and third countries; the 21st package lists 27 firms in third countries, 14 in China (detours).
China
2026: +4.5% · share of world merchandise exports 2025: 14.3% · share of world GDP (purchasing power) 2026: 19.9%
China is the target of most export controls on frontier technology and at the same time the author of its own controls on raw materials such as rare earths (see the magazine chapter). Trade with the United States has shrunk by more than a fifth since 2024 (UNCTAD); China’s share of US imports fell from 13.8 to 9.3 percent in 2025 (WTO). Germany’s imports from China rose by 8.8 percent to 170.6 billion euros in 2025, while its exports there fell by 9.7 percent (Destatis).
Asia
India 2026: +7.0% · Asian export volume 2026: +9.9% · AI goods: 14.8% of merchandise trade
According to UNCTAD, Asia accounts for around 60 percent of global growth in 2026. The trade upswing depends on goods for artificial intelligence, which made up 14.8 percent of merchandise trade and about 47 percent of its growth in the first half of 2026 (WTO). The EU and India concluded negotiations on a trade agreement on 27 January 2026. More than half of the 465 million jobs that depend on trade, according to the ILO, are in Asia and the Pacific.
The Gulf and the Middle East
Middle East and Central Asia 2026: −0.3% · Saudi Arabia: −3.3% · Iran: −7.6% · Middle East export volume: −17.2%
The war with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are the biggest blockade of the year. Before the war, according to the WTO, about 20 million barrels of oil a day passed through the strait; 3.5 to 5.5 million could be rerouted. In the first half of 2026 the region’s crude oil exports fell by about 24 percent and its LNG exports by about 47 percent. Brent peaked at 138 US dollars on 8 April 2026, against about 70 before the war; after an agreement in June the price fell to about 75 and has since returned to about 100 US dollars. The IMF cut its forecast for the region by 2.2 percentage points compared with April. The blockade of Qatar by its neighbours from 2017 to 2021 shows that there are blockades within the region too (magazine chapter).
Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa 2026: +4.5% · direct investment 2025: −26% · remittance costs: 8.16%
According to the IMF, the economy south of the Sahara grows by 4.5 percent in 2026, according to the World Bank by 4.0 percent. Direct investment into Africa fell by 26 percent to 70 billion US dollars in 2025, after an exceptional year (UNCTAD). Remittances to Sub-Saharan Africa are the most expensive in the world at a fee of 8.16 percent (World Bank, fourth quarter of 2024), and the region has lost 34.2 percent of its correspondent banking relationships since 2011 (BIS). According to the World Bank, one third of low-income economies will be poorer at the end of 2026 than in 2019.
Cuba
UN vote 28 Oct 2026: 130 in favour, 17 against, 25 abstentions · EU exports to Cuba 2025 vs 2015: −44.3% · 1,351 political prisoners
Cuba is the focus of this week and one of the oldest cases still in force. The US embargo has existed since the early 1960s; in 2026 additional tariffs against countries supplying Cuba with oil were added (Executive Order 14380). EU exports to Cuba fell from 2,139.6 million euros (2015) to 1,191.4 million euros (2025), minus 44.3 percent (Eurostat, own analysis); the data show the decline, not its cause. Equally part of the picture is the failure of the Cuban leadership: a currency reform in 2021 with severe inflation, tight limits on private initiative and political imprisonment. Amnesty International called the releases of 2025 selective; Prisoners Defenders counted 1,351 political prisoners in September 2026. On 28 October 2026 the UN General Assembly called for an end to the embargo with 130 votes in favour, 17 against and 25 abstentions (Putting the UN vote in context, Cuba 2026 as a case).
5. Money, law, labour
Trade needs finance, payment routes and courts. For all three, the data show bottlenecks that hit poorer and smaller countries harder. In detail: What does business need?.
| Area | Key figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Trade finance gap | 2.5 trillion US dollars (2025); 41 percent of applications by small and medium firms rejected | ADB |
| Correspondent banks | decline 2011 to 2022 in every region; US dollar 50.9 percent of payment value | BIS, CPMI |
| Cost of sending 200 US dollars | 6.26 percent worldwide, 8.16 percent to Sub-Saharan Africa (Q4 2024); target below 3 percent | World Bank |
| G20 targets for cross-border payments | “unlikely” to be met worldwide by 2027 | FSB, October 2025 |
| WTO dispute settlement | Appellate Body without members since December 2019; interim arrangement with 59 of 166 members (April 2026) | Wikipedia (secondary source) |
| Jobs depending on trade | 465 million worldwide, more than half in Asia and the Pacific | ILO |
| Uncertainty as a barrier to investment | 83 percent of EU firms | EIB, 2025 |
Number of active correspondent banking relationships, change 2011 to 2022 in percent, by region of the bank. Basis: payment messages via SWIFT.
| Region | Change |
|---|---|
| Americas excl. North America | −47.1% |
| Oceania | −37.8% |
| Europe excl. Eastern Europe | −34.2% |
| Africa | −34.2% |
| Eastern Europe | −34.0% |
| Asia | −29.9% |
| Northern America | −19.4% |
Source: BIS, Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI), correspondent banking data, chartpack May 2023, table 2 (MT 103 and MT 202 excl. MT 202COV).
6. Where things could go
For the long run there are only ranges. The IMF estimates the cost of a split into blocs at 0.2 to 7 percent of world output, 8 to 12 percent in some countries with technological decoupling; with two blocs by 2050, the WTO expects 13 percent less world trade and losses of 6.5 percent of GDP for developing and about 3 percent for developed economies; the ECB arrives at up to 9 percent in the extreme case. In the short run, in April 2026 the IMF considered world growth of around 2 percent possible in a severe oil shock; according to the October forecast it is 3.1 percent. In detail: Where are we heading?.
Loss compared with a world without fragmentation. The studies measure different things (world output, income of individual countries, national expenditure) at different horizons; they cannot be added up. Axis: percent.
Values as table
| Estimate | Source | Range |
|---|---|---|
| Split into blocs, world, long run | IMF 2023 | 0.2 to 7% of world GDP |
| plus technological decoupling, some countries | IMF 2023 | 8 to 12% of GDP |
| Fragmented direct investment, world | IMF 2023 | about 2% of world GDP |
| two blocs by 2050, developed and developing | WTO 2023 | 3 and 6.5% of GDP |
| partial rivalry, world, by 2050 | WTO 2023 | 2.8% of GDP |
| extreme case: barriers between blocs, world | ECB 2024 | up to 9% of world GDP |
| hard decoupling from China, Germany, permanent | Kiel 2024 | 1 to 2% of national expenditure |
| same, Germany, first months | Kiel 2024 | 4 to 5% |
Sources: IMF SDN/2023/001; IMF blog on WEO April 2023, chapter 4; WTO, World Trade Report 2023, figure D.4; ECB Occasional Paper 365; Kiel Policy Brief 170. Compiled by Helfen statt Blockieren, daten/werte_berichte.csv.
Share of world gross domestic product at purchasing power parity, percent; 2030 IMF projection.
| Year | China | United States | EU | India |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1990 | 3.6 | 21.7 | 25.0 | 3.4 |
| 2000 | 6.7 | 20.4 | 21.6 | 3.9 |
| 2010 | 12.8 | 17.1 | 17.6 | 5.3 |
| 2020 | 18.4 | 15.3 | 15.2 | 6.8 |
| 2025 | 19.6 | 14.6 | 14.0 | 8.2 |
| 2030 (projection) | 20.3 | 13.9 | 12.9 | 9.9 |
Source: IMF DataMapper, series PPPSH (WEO October 2026), accessed 3 Nov 2026; daten/ergebnis_iwf_anteil_kkp.csv.
7. Gaps, method, limits
This report relies only on published data and reports from independent and well-known bodies: the IMF, World Bank, WTO, UNCTAD, OECD, BIS, ILO, ECB, European Investment Bank, Asian Development Bank, Financial Stability Board, Destatis, Eurostat, the institutes of the German joint forecast, the Kiel Institute, the Global Sanctions Data Base and Global Trade Alert (key figures only, licence CC BY-NC 4.0). Where the primary page could not be retrieved, the secondary source is named and marked. Our own calculations (shares, annual means, index) are provided as a script and table. The report contains no forecast of its own.
Check the numbers: daten/abruf.py downloads the IMF, World Bank and uncertainty series; the extracts are in daten/ergebnis_*.csv, values taken from reports in daten/werte_berichte.csv.
This analysis is information, not legal, tax or investment advice. It reflects the view of the editorial team, presents arguments from both sides and makes no forecast of its own. “Helfen statt Blockieren” is non-partisan.
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All online sources accessed on 3 November 2026. Secondary sources are marked; the figures there come from the publisher named.