In 1950, 18 sanction cases were in force worldwide; in 2023 there were 615. This analysis shows who started to sanction more and when, with which instruments and for which goals. It draws on three research datasets, and every figure can be recalculated from the files in the daten/ folder.
How many cases there are
Active means in force in that year. New means imposed in that year. A case is a measure by one sender against one target for one reason, however many people or goods it covers.
| Year | active cases | new cases |
|---|---|---|
| 1950 | 18 | 18 |
| 1951 | 25 | 7 |
| 1952 | 27 | 3 |
| 1953 | 26 | 0 |
| 1954 | 34 | 10 |
| 1955 | 30 | 2 |
| 1956 | 30 | 2 |
| 1957 | 33 | 5 |
| 1958 | 35 | 4 |
| 1959 | 33 | 1 |
| 1960 | 37 | 8 |
| 1961 | 39 | 6 |
| 1962 | 46 | 12 |
| 1963 | 59 | 16 |
| 1964 | 57 | 9 |
| 1965 | 62 | 11 |
| 1966 | 64 | 6 |
| 1967 | 65 | 10 |
| 1968 | 72 | 10 |
| 1969 | 72 | 3 |
| 1970 | 70 | 3 |
| 1971 | 67 | 5 |
| 1972 | 61 | 1 |
| 1973 | 78 | 21 |
| 1974 | 84 | 8 |
| 1975 | 76 | 13 |
| 1976 | 76 | 6 |
| 1977 | 90 | 19 |
| 1978 | 98 | 14 |
| 1979 | 106 | 15 |
| 1980 | 90 | 4 |
| 1981 | 97 | 9 |
| 1982 | 115 | 26 |
| 1983 | 107 | 6 |
| 1984 | 103 | 5 |
| 1985 | 93 | 10 |
| 1986 | 102 | 15 |
| 1987 | 113 | 18 |
| 1988 | 114 | 8 |
| 1989 | 124 | 17 |
| 1990 | 136 | 29 |
| 1991 | 136 | 25 |
| 1992 | 161 | 48 |
| 1993 | 167 | 33 |
| 1994 | 158 | 18 |
| 1995 | 143 | 25 |
| 1996 | 149 | 27 |
| 1997 | 152 | 21 |
| 1998 | 155 | 27 |
| 1999 | 149 | 17 |
| 2000 | 149 | 22 |
| 2001 | 148 | 16 |
| 2002 | 135 | 21 |
| 2003 | 155 | 36 |
| 2004 | 141 | 10 |
| 2005 | 146 | 20 |
| 2006 | 159 | 34 |
| 2007 | 157 | 13 |
| 2008 | 157 | 12 |
| 2009 | 173 | 29 |
| 2010 | 181 | 24 |
| 2011 | 217 | 47 |
| 2012 | 239 | 40 |
| 2013 | 247 | 23 |
| 2014 | 276 | 46 |
| 2015 | 257 | 16 |
| 2016 | 261 | 16 |
| 2017 | 242 | 30 |
| 2018 | 252 | 31 |
| 2019 | 271 | 36 |
| 2020 | 305 | 44 |
| 2021 | 400 | 103 |
| 2022 | 500 | 119 |
| 2023 | 615 | 121 |
Source: GSDB Release 4, figures 1 and 5b, digitised by Helfen statt Blockieren (reference).
Until 1989 the stock grew steadily by about 2.6 cases per year (R² 0.95). From 1990 to 2009 it stayed almost flat (+0.5 per year): many Cold War cases ended while new ones were added, mainly by the UN and the EU. From 2010 to 2023 the stock rose by 23.2 cases per year, from 2019 to 2023 by 88.3. The best-fitting broken line bends in 2018 (in 2019 if only three instead of five years are required after the bend): +3.1 cases per year before, +70.3 after. On average 27.0 new cases a year were imposed in the 1990s and 96.8 in 2020 to 2023. The database authors explain the rise since 2019 by the fact that hardly any sanctions were lifted while many new ones were imposed, from 2022 mainly against Russia and Belarus (GSDB R4, GSDB R3).
Who sanctions, and since when more
Calculated from each sender’s share of all active cases (GSDB, figure 5b) times the number of active cases (figure 1). “Others” covers all other states and groups, including the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Canada, Japan and the Arab League; the figures do not show them separately.
| Year | US | EU | UN | others |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1950 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 1951 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 14 |
| 1952 | 9 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| 1953 | 8 | 0 | 2 | 16 |
| 1954 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 23 |
| 1955 | 9 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| 1956 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 18 |
| 1957 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| 1958 | 13 | 0 | 1 | 21 |
| 1959 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 20 |
| 1960 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 21 |
| 1961 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 22 |
| 1962 | 21 | 0 | 1 | 24 |
| 1963 | 25 | 0 | 2 | 32 |
| 1964 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 31 |
| 1965 | 22 | 0 | 3 | 37 |
| 1966 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 39 |
| 1967 | 20 | 0 | 5 | 40 |
| 1968 | 24 | 0 | 6 | 42 |
| 1969 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 43 |
| 1970 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 41 |
| 1971 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 38 |
| 1972 | 20 | 0 | 6 | 35 |
| 1973 | 18 | 0 | 6 | 54 |
| 1974 | 19 | 0 | 6 | 59 |
| 1975 | 23 | 0 | 5 | 48 |
| 1976 | 26 | 0 | 4 | 46 |
| 1977 | 36 | 0 | 5 | 49 |
| 1978 | 38 | 1 | 4 | 55 |
| 1979 | 41 | 2 | 4 | 59 |
| 1980 | 39 | 0 | 2 | 49 |
| 1981 | 43 | 2 | 2 | 50 |
| 1982 | 43 | 4 | 2 | 66 |
| 1983 | 40 | 3 | 2 | 62 |
| 1984 | 38 | 2 | 3 | 60 |
| 1985 | 39 | 2 | 3 | 49 |
| 1986 | 41 | 5 | 4 | 52 |
| 1987 | 47 | 4 | 4 | 58 |
| 1988 | 46 | 4 | 4 | 60 |
| 1989 | 51 | 5 | 4 | 64 |
| 1990 | 56 | 8 | 6 | 66 |
| 1991 | 52 | 10 | 8 | 66 |
| 1992 | 55 | 17 | 12 | 77 |
| 1993 | 58 | 17 | 14 | 78 |
| 1994 | 59 | 18 | 16 | 65 |
| 1995 | 60 | 16 | 11 | 56 |
| 1996 | 61 | 20 | 14 | 54 |
| 1997 | 63 | 22 | 15 | 52 |
| 1998 | 64 | 24 | 17 | 50 |
| 1999 | 59 | 27 | 16 | 47 |
| 2000 | 57 | 26 | 20 | 46 |
| 2001 | 59 | 25 | 21 | 43 |
| 2002 | 57 | 26 | 18 | 34 |
| 2003 | 69 | 29 | 17 | 40 |
| 2004 | 64 | 26 | 15 | 36 |
| 2005 | 56 | 27 | 19 | 44 |
| 2006 | 60 | 26 | 22 | 51 |
| 2007 | 60 | 25 | 22 | 50 |
| 2008 | 62 | 25 | 21 | 49 |
| 2009 | 62 | 31 | 21 | 59 |
| 2010 | 61 | 29 | 25 | 66 |
| 2011 | 72 | 38 | 27 | 80 |
| 2012 | 81 | 42 | 30 | 86 |
| 2013 | 87 | 45 | 32 | 83 |
| 2014 | 89 | 52 | 35 | 100 |
| 2015 | 83 | 48 | 37 | 89 |
| 2016 | 85 | 46 | 36 | 94 |
| 2017 | 91 | 38 | 31 | 82 |
| 2018 | 101 | 36 | 31 | 84 |
| 2019 | 124 | 35 | 29 | 83 |
| 2020 | 146 | 41 | 29 | 89 |
| 2021 | 180 | 47 | 29 | 144 |
| 2022 | 225 | 55 | 30 | 190 |
| 2023 | 286 | 67 | 29 | 233 |
Source: GSDB Release 4, figures 1 and 5b, digitised by Helfen statt Blockieren (reference).
Least squares over the five annual values; the table below gives all periods.
| cases per year | |
|---|---|
| US | +40.3 |
| EU | +7.8 |
| UN | +0.1 |
| others | +40.1 |
Source: GSDB Release 4, figures 1 and 5b, digitised by Helfen statt Blockieren (reference).
| Sender | 1950 to 1989 | 1990 to 2009 | 2010 to 2023 | 2019 to 2023 | Break year | before | after | above 25 cases since |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| all | 2.56 | 0.51 | 23.19 | 88.30 | 2018 | 3.10 | 70.27 | 1952 |
| US | 1.05 | 0.30 | 13.51 | 40.30 | 2018 | 1.17 | 37.27 | 1976 |
| EU | 0.10 | 0.90 | 1.25 | 7.80 | 1983 | 0.05 | 1.27 | 2009 |
| UN | 0.08 | 0.66 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 1985 | 0.09 | 0.81 | 2011 |
| others | 1.34 | −1.35 | 8.42 | 40.10 | 2018 | 0.79 | 27.06 | 1963 |
Slopes in cases per year. Break year: the year at which a line with one bend fits best (search over all years, at least eight years before and five after). For the EU a second bend fits in 2019 (+4.07 per year afterwards), for the UN in 2016 (−0.65 per year afterwards).
United States. Over the whole period the US was the largest single sender. From 1950 to 1989 the trend added about 1.1 active cases per year, from 1990 to 2009 only 0.3. From 2018 the increase accelerated to about 37 per year; the largest single-year increase came in 2023 (+61). The US share was 32.1% in 2014, 47.7% in 2020 and 46.5% in 2023. Many new US cases are targeted measures against individuals and companies rather than whole economies (GSDB R4).
European Union. The European Community appears as a joint sender from 1978; from 1983 its stock grew steadily, and faster from 2019 (+7.8 per year in 2019 to 2023), mainly through the packages against Russia and Belarus. In 2023 it had 67 active cases.
United Nations. The UN rarely imposed sanctions before 1990. After the deadlock in the Security Council ended, its stock rose to 37 by 2015; it has been falling since. The database authors point to vetoes, such as Russia’s veto against sanctions after the 2023 coup in Niger and against extending the sanctions on Mali (GSDB R4).
Others. This group grew until 1989, shrank until 2009 (−1.4 per year) and has risen steeply since 2018 to 2020 (depending on the calculation) (+40.1 per year in 2019 to 2023). The database names Russian counter-sanctions after the attack on Ukraine and, after Brexit, the United Kingdom’s own sanctions as the main drivers after 2020 (GSDB R4, GSDB R3).
The long line since 1914
174 cases with a foreign policy goal; the start year is part of the case number (14-1 means 1914). The column “2000” covers the year 2000 only.
| cases | |
|---|---|
| 1910s | 3 |
| 1920s | 2 |
| 1930s | 5 |
| 1940s | 9 |
| 1950s | 13 |
| 1960s | 21 |
| 1970s | 37 |
| 1980s | 31 |
| 1990s | 52 |
| 2000 | 1 |
Source: Hufbauer et al. 2007, table 1A.1; own count, checked against table 1.1 of the book.
A case counts for every sender involved. TIES also counts threats that were never carried out, so the numbers are higher than in the other sources.
| US | United Kingdom | USSR and Russia | China | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945 to 1949 | 24 | 10 | 6 | 2 |
| 1950s | 52 | 11 | 6 | 1 |
| 1960s | 72 | 13 | 10 | 3 |
| 1970s | 44 | 9 | 3 | 2 |
| 1980s | 117 | 33 | 3 | 2 |
| 1990s | 277 | 17 | 13 | 13 |
| 2000 to 2005 | 153 | 23 | 6 | 2 |
Source: TIES 4.0, own analysis.
Before 1950 Hufbauer and co-authors record 19 cases, among them the British blockade of Germany in 1914 and the League of Nations measures against Italy in 1935. New cases rose from 13 in the 1950s to 52 in the 1990s. In 106 of the 174 cases the US is listed first among the senders. TIES shows the same movement with more cases because threats count as well: cases involving the US rose from 52 in the 1950s to 277 in the 1990s; the United Kingdom was most active in the 1980s (33), China in the 1990s (13), the Soviet Union and Russia in the 1960s and 1990s. Much on China is missing in the older datasets: the dedicated China collection by Zhang and Shanks counts 135 episodes with China as sender from 1949 to 2020, over 70 percent of them absent from earlier datasets (China TIES).
Which instruments are used
Stacked. One case can have several types, so the total exceeds the number of cases. Values on hover, tap or tab key every five years.
- Trade
- Arms
- Military aid
- Financial
- Travel
- Other
Data as table
| Type | Share 1950 | 1970 | 1990 | 2010 | 2023 | Cases 2023 | Trend 2010 to 2023 per year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trade | 61.9% | 27.2% | 24.3% | 18.7% | 21.2% | 257 | +9.7 |
| Arms | 4.8% | 24.3% | 14.1% | 17.0% | 7.7% | 94 | +1.5 |
| Military aid | 0.0% | 4.9% | 12.6% | 13.0% | 6.4% | 77 | +1.1 |
| Financial | 9.6% | 19.4% | 33.0% | 25.2% | 36.4% | 441 | +18.9 |
| Travel | 9.5% | 8.8% | 4.4% | 16.8% | 22.1% | 267 | +12.7 |
| Other | 14.3% | 15.5% | 11.7% | 9.2% | 6.2% | 75 | +1.6 |
Source: GSDB Release 4, figure 2, digitised; annual values in daten/gsdb_r4_jahr.csv (reference).
In 1950, 61.9% of all measures were trade sanctions. In 2023 their share was 21.2%, although their number rose to 257. Financial sanctions (asset freezes, bans on dealings with banks) grew fastest, by about 19 a year since 2010, to 36.4% in 2023, followed by travel restrictions on individuals, from 4.4% (1990) to 22.1%. The researchers see this as a shift from comprehensive to targeted measures (GSDB R4).
What sanctions are meant to achieve
A case can have up to three goals; each goal counts once. Mapping of the 15 TIES categories to six groups: see method.
- Regime change
- Human rights
- Terrorism
- Conflict and arms
- Other policy
- Trade dispute
Data as table
| Decade | cases | Regime change | Human rights | Terrorism | Conflict and arms | Other policy | Trade dispute |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1945/49 | 45 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 18 | 16 | 16 |
| 1950s | 97 | 1 | 12 | 5 | 26 | 47 | 17 |
| 1960s | 131 | 20 | 4 | 1 | 41 | 57 | 30 |
| 1970s | 111 | 4 | 28 | 7 | 22 | 55 | 14 |
| 1980s | 226 | 3 | 23 | 4 | 29 | 42 | 140 |
| 1990s | 547 | 17 | 26 | 3 | 21 | 85 | 426 |
| 2000/05 | 255 | 5 | 15 | 3 | 23 | 103 | 114 |
Source: TIES 4.0, own analysis.
| Goal by keyword (Hufbauer et al.) | Cases 1914 to 1989 | 1990 to 2000 | total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Democracy | 2 | 13 | 15 |
| Human rights | 25 | 12 | 37 |
| Terrorism | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Conflict and arms | 39 | 14 | 53 |
| Regime change | 14 | 1 | 15 |
| Other policy | 37 | 9 | 46 |
In TIES, conflict, arms and general policy dominate until the 1970s; human rights first become a major theme in the 1970s (28 goals). Trade disputes dominate the 1980s and 1990s because TIES also counts threats in tariff conflicts. In Hufbauer and co-authors, 13 of 53 cases from 1990 to 2000 name democracy as a goal, against 2 of 121 before 1990. For the years after 2005 there is no freely available count by goal. The GSDB describes for 1950 to 2022: sanctions for human rights rise steadily, those for territorial disputes and regime change decline; since the early 1990s sanctions against war and terrorism have grown, and sanctions to change a policy peaked in 2022 (GSDB R3).
Method and limits
GSDB. The Global Sanctions Data Base itself is only available on request, and its terms prohibit redistribution (website). The annual values here therefore come from the vector graphics of the public working paper on Release 4: each line has exactly one point per year, converted via the grid lines. Cross-checks with the text of the paper match: growth of active cases 31.1 instead of 31.2 percent in 2021, 25.0 and 23.0 percent in 2022 and 2023 as stated, US share 47.7 percent in 2020 (“peaking at 47%”); the four shares add up to 100 percent in every year. Values by type are accurate to about two cases. Release 5 of the Global Sanctions Data Base counts 1,794 cases from 1950 to the end of 2025; its data are available only on request. Annual figures for active cases (such as 615 in 2023) come from the published charts of Release 4 and run to 2023.
What is counted. A case says nothing about severity: a comprehensive embargo counts the same as an entry ban on one person. Rising case numbers therefore mainly mean more targeted measures.
TIES counts threats and impositions until 2005, Hufbauer et al. only larger cases with a foreign policy goal until 2000. The goal groups for Hufbauer et al. come from keywords in the goal column of the table (for example “democracy”, “human rights”, “terror”, “war”, “nuclear”) and are an approximation. TIES goals: regime change (code 3), human rights (8), terrorism and non-state actors (10), conflict and arms (2, 5, 6, 9), trade dispute (13, 14), other policy (1, 4, 7, 11, 12, 15).
Trends are descriptive. A break year does not prove a structural break; it shows where the slope changes most clearly.
Recalculate
Data for checking the figures (CSV): gsdb_r4_jahr.csv, ties4_faelle_nach_beginnjahr.csv, ties4_verhaengungen_nach_jahr.csv, ties4_art_nach_jahrzehnt.csv, ties4_ziele_nach_jahrzehnt.csv, hse_1914_2000_faelle.csv, ergebnis_trends_gsdb.csv, ergebnis_wendepunkte_gsdb.csv, ergebnis_arten_gsdb.csv, ergebnis_ties_akteure.csv, quellen_lizenzen.csv.
The tools for download, preparation and calculation are kept by the editorial team. We do not publish raw data from Global Trade Alert (licence CC BY-NC 4.0) or the folder of downloaded original files.
Continue: Economic bloc against economic bloc and the magazine chapter Blockades of the world economy.
Sources
- Yalcin, Felbermayr, Kariem, Kirilakha, Kwon, Syropoulos, Yotov: The Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 4. CGPA Working Paper 2025-02, Drexel University, 22 January 2025 (not peer reviewed). https://www.lebow.drexel.edu/sites/default/files/2025-01/wp2025002-global-sanctions-db-v2.pdf
- Syropoulos, Felbermayr, Kirilakha, Yalcin, Yotov: The Global Sanctions Data Base, Release 3. WIFO Working Paper 651, 2022; peer reviewed in Review of International Economics 32(1), 2024, pp. 12 to 48. https://www.wifo.ac.at/wp-content/uploads/upload-3619/wp_2022_651_.pdf
- Global Sanctions Data Base, website: access on request only, Release 5 with 1,794 cases to end 2025, redistribution prohibited. https://www.globalsanctionsdatabase.com/
- Morgan, Bapat, Kobayashi: Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945 to 2005, Updating the TIES Dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5), 2014, pp. 541 to 558; data TIES 4.0. https://sanctions.web.unc.edu/
- Zhang, Shanks: Measuring Chinese Economic Sanctions 1949 to 2020, Introducing the China TIES Dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 42(3), 2025, pp. 328 to 352. https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v42y2025i3p328-352.html
- Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, Oegg: Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition, Peterson Institute 2007, chapter 1 (publisher preview), tables 1.1 and 1A.1. https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4075/01iie4075.pdf